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INFERENCE FROM CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE BY ACCUSED.
WAiTER T. DuN0moR,
Dean of Western Reserve University Law School.
Proposal number three submitted by the recent Ohio Consti-
tutional Convention to the voters of Ohio. for ratification contains
the provision that, "No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case,
to be a witness against himself, but his failure to testify may be consid-
ered by the court and jury and may be made the subject of comment by
counsel." This proposal was adopted by a very large majority when
submitted.
Before the adoption of this proposal, the Ohio constitution, ratified
in 1851, in Article I, Section 10, contained, among other provisions,
the words, "Nor shall any person be compelled, in any criminal case, to
be a witness against himself." The Code of Criminal Procedure adopted
by the Ohio legislature May 6, 1869, provided in Section 140: "In the
trial of all indictments, complaints, and other proceedings against per-
sons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, the person so
charged, shall, at his own request, but not- otherwise, be deemed a com-
petent witness; nor shall the neglect or refusal to testify create any
presumption against him, nor shall any reference be made to, nor any
comment made upon, such neglect or refusal." A similar provision is
still found in The Ohio General Code of 1910, Section 13661.
In view of the fact that nearly all of the states have embodied in
their constitutions similar provisions, and that in all but three American
jurisdictions there is legislation prohibiting the state from availing
itself of any inference by reason of the failure of accused to testify, the
question arises whether the change made by Ohio is a defensible one
and one which should be made in other jurisdictions.
To answer intelligently this question, it first must be decided
whether defendant should be required, in a criminal case, to testify as
any other person.
In Vohune 2, page 216, of the Joun-r, OF CRIMINAL JAW AND
CRIMAINOLOGY, Mr. Charles R. Bostwick takes the position that defend-
ant should be available to the prosecution as a witness. Not a few
lawyers now may be found who agree with Mr. Bostwick, and those who
do so would doubtless find no fault with the Ohio amendment except
that it does not go far enough. One of the most distinguished jurists
to take a position against the rule excusing the accused from giving
self-disserving testimony' was Jeremy Bentham. Many lengthy argu-
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ments relative to this privilege of accused might be restated, but it is
believed that a very brief review of the reasons suggested by Bentham
will serve to clear the way for the ascertainment of the reason why the.
privilege remains everywhere so firmly intrenched.
In Volume 7, at page 451 of Bentham's Works, as published by
his executor, John Bowring, is found a discussion of what Bentham
terms "Pretences for the Exclusion." According to Bentham, these
pretences are five in number:
(1) The position is taken by some that the propriety of the rule
excusing defendant is too clearly evident to admit of any dispute.
There certainly is nothing in the history of the rule as given in Ben-
tlam's Works, Volume 7, page 458, to justify the taking of any such
position and that many take this position is no argument for its sound-
ness. Bentham clearly was justified in ignoring those on whom all
argument would be lost.
(2) "The old woman's reason." This reason is that it is a hard-
ship for the accused to be obliged to incriminate himself. Bentham is
easily able to expose the fallacy of such an argument. In fact the
courts have taken the position that the privilege is for the benefit of
the innocent and not of the guilty,' and probably no -one would now
urge that the hardship in the case of an accused who is actually guilty
is any reason, why he should not be compelled to testify against himself.
(3) "The fox-hunter's reason." This conception merely intro-
duces into legal procedure the idea of fairness, the idea that accused
should be given a sporting chance for his escape by acquittal. The
"game" theory of a lawsuit already has too strong a grasp upon our law
of Procedure and with the numerous safeguards now thrown about
accused, even the most conservative probably would not consider this
reason as possessing any considerable merit.
(4) "Confounding interrogation with torture." If accused were
compelled to testify, the method of extorting confessions to which
recourse is so frequently had by police officers would be unnecessary to
a very large extent. Far less physical torture would result from the
examination in open court than now results from the continued efforts
to extract a statement before trial.
(5)_ "Reference to unpopular institutions." Because confessions
were extorted under the Inquisition and in the Court of Star Chamber,
therefore one now should never be compelled to incriminate himself.
This association has doubtless been of prime importance in giving the
1J. Byles in Bartlett v. Lewis, 12 C. B. N. S. 249 at 265, "The rule was
intended for the protection of the innocent, and not for that of the guilty."
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privilege the dignity of constitutional protection, but nevertheless it is
difficult to find therein any real argument for the privilege. It must
be kept in mind that this privilege arose at a time when accused was
not permitted to testify in his own behalf and that conditions are not
at all similar at the present time.
To those who are considering the privilege from a theoretical
stanidpoint, the protection of the accused from judicial questioning at
the trial seems indefensible. The rule seems to prohibit the investigator
after truth from going to the primary source and to force his reliance
upon secondary and less satisfactory evidence. The parent seeking to
ascertain whether his child has been guilty of any delinquency prefers
to question that child directly, rather than to receive the statements of
a number of other children. Everyone feels that the natural way to
learn of the guilt or innocence of the accused is to question him directly.,
The writer has always had difficulty in placing the defense of this privi-
lege upon a logical basis, and if the reasons suggested by Bentham were
the only ones in favor of this privilege, it seems that no defense of
the rule could be maintained.
Unbiased defenders of this privilege, however, recognize that it is
practical considerations which must constitute their defense. Undoubt-
edly this privilege is highly advantageous to the guilty, but we must
remember that some of those placed on trial are innocent. Sir James
Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law of- England' says that the
fact that the prisoner cannot be interrogated "stimulates the search for
independent evidence." That this is true cannot be questioned. Pro-
fessor Wigmore after a careful consideration of the.history and policy
of this privilege concludes,3 "that any system of administration which
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure
as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby."
-- In the rush of criminal business the prosecution would depend more
and more upon its ability to build a case upon defendant's own testi-
mony. The prosecutor would be strongly tempted to seek by clever
questioning the answers which would help toward establishing the guilt
,of the accused. The abolition of the _privilege, in actual practice, tends
to place in jeopardy the safety of the innocent person charged with a
criminal offense by leading to a careless examination of sources of proof
other than the testimony of the accused. American lawyers who have
attended a criminal trial in France or have read a full report of such a
trial seldom urge that the method of questioning accused leads to a more
2Vol. I, p. 442.
3Vol. IV, Sec. 2251, p. 3097.
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fair and dignified trial. One has but to read an account of a French
prosecution such as that of the case of the Monk LMotade4 to have
raised in his mind serious doubts as to the practical wisdom of abol-
ishing the privilege in question. The time may come when attorneys
for the state will be so little partisan that innocent defendants will need
no such protection as now exists, but the writer believes that the experi-
ence of other countries does not warrant the present abolition of this
privilege which now exists in every American jurisdiction.
If the privilege against compulsory self-disclosure should be
retained, the question remains whether there is any justification for a
change which would permit an inference from the claim of this privi-
lege by the accused.
A logical justification for such an inference might be made by tak-
ing the ground that the position of the accused as a defendant and as a
witness is a dual one, and that the failure of accused to produce him-
self as a witness is the same as his failure to produce any other witness.
The dual position of accused is frequently recognized in other connec-
tions. If accused does testify voluntarily, the state is usually permit-
ted to prove the commission of other crimes by accused to attack his
credibility as a witness, although such evidence of other crimes is clearly
inadmissible in proof of his guilt of the crime charged when guilty
knowledge is not involved. Strictly speaking, it is difficult to see how
the personal privilege not to testify is violated so long as accused is not
actually required to testify. However, in justifying a change in refer-
ence to a privilege so universally granted, something more than a mere
technical justification must be found.
As before stated, it appears that the privilege against -compulsory
incrimination can be defended only by reason of practical considera-
tions. It has seemed to nearly all courts and text-writers that exactly
the same practical considerations should prevent the making of any
inference when accused avails himself of his privilege. If requiring
accused to testify directly would cause the prosecution to rely for proof
upon the testimony of defendant rather than upon a careful investiga-
tion of other sources of evidence, would not the same result be reached
if prosecution could rely either upon the testimony of accused or upon
the inference of guilt which would be urged strongly upon the jury
when accused failed to take the stand? It must be admitted that the
difference in the evil involved between compelling accused to testify,
or in permitting an inference from his failure so to do is after all only
4An account of this case is given in Sir Stephen's History of Criminal Law,
Vol. III, p. 466.
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a difference in degree. To a certain extent the prosecution would doubt-
less rely upon the advantage given it by.virtue of the inference. Never-
theless, it seems clear that the prosecution could rely far less upon the
inference than it could upon a right to call accused as a witness for the
state. The prosecution, even when inference is permitted, has no benefit
therefrom until a sufficiently stroig case has been presented to the
tribunal to warrant the submission of the case to the jury. The prose
cution must make an investigation thorough enough to reveal evidence,
other than testimony of accused, sutfficient to make out a prima facie
case and to sustain its burden of proof. The prosecution in France may
bring a defendant to trial with hope of success, even when there is little
evidence of his guilt obtained from sources other than the accused,
because of reliance upon the right to examine him, but the state under
the Ohio amendment must in the first instance at least produce sub-
stantial evidence of guilt without the aid of defendanfs 'testimony. It
seems, therefore, that this difference in degree is such a substantial dif-
ference that there is no reason to expect the same evils from merely per-
initting an inference as would probably result from permitting prose-
cution to rely upon testimony of accused as part of its evidence in chief.
We unhesitatingly admit as evidence the conduct of accused out of
court when charged with crime and from the point of view of logical
relevancy, there is no possible objection to permitting an inference. In
fact, it is inevitable that the jury will make the inference. Allowing
counsel to comment upon failure of accused to take the stand and thus
to emphasize the inference will take away fxom a guilty defendant a
protection to which he is not entitled, without a corresponding danger
to an innocent accused because of a failure properly to investigate his
case.
The writer believes that the weight of practical considerations is
all that makes it expedient to continue the privilege against compulsory
self-disclosure in criminal cases, that these practical considerations have
not the same weight in connection with the inference from claim of
privilege and that, in view of the extreme need in America of more
certainty of punishment, the inference permitted by the Ohio amend-
ment will be of decided value in criminal prosecutions.
